《经济学人》双语：将俄罗斯排除在SWIFT之外，真的值吗？
原文标题：
Economic Sanctions
SWIFT thinking
The consequences of excluding Russia from the global payments system
经济制裁
关于SWIFT的思考
将俄罗斯排除在全球支付体系之外的后果
The hidden costs of cutting Russia off from SWIFT
America’s foes would rush to alternatives, hastening its financial decline
切断俄罗斯与SWIFT关联的隐性成本
美国的对手会立马寻找替代品，加速其金融衰退
[Paragraph 1]
FOR WEEKS Russia has been massing troops and tanks near the Ukrainian border.
几周以来，俄罗斯一直在乌克兰边境附近集结军队和坦克。
Neither talks with nor threats from the West have stemmed the flow.
与西方的谈判和来自西方的威胁都没能阻止这场行动。
With America and its allies loth to commit forces, another option is gaining prominence: cutting Russia off from SWIFT, the messaging network used by 11,000 banks in 200 countries to make cross-border payments.
由于美国及其盟国不愿动用武力，另一个选择正在受到瞩目：切断俄罗斯与SWIFT系统的联系。SWIFT系统是200个国家的11000家银行用于跨境支付的通信网络。
Flicking a switch seems safer than putting boots on the ground.
启动这一开关似乎比发动地面战争看起来安全些。
But it could have dangerous consequences.
但这可能会有危险的后果。
[Paragraph 2]
A first hurdle would be getting SWIFT to comply.
第一个难关是要获得SWIFT方的同意。
The co-operative of banks, based in Belgium, vows to be politically neutral.
这个总部设在比利时的银行合作社声明称要在政治上保持中立。
Many European countries, such as Germany, do a lot of business with Russia, and may oppose the plan. But there is a precedent.
许多欧洲国家，与俄罗斯做了大量生意，有可能会反对该计划，比如德国。但有一个先例。
In 2022 America managed to force SWIFT to ditch Iranian banks even in the face of European resistance.
2022年，美国成功迫使SWIFT抛弃伊朗的银行，即使面对欧洲的抵制。
America would probably have its way again.
美国可能会再次这么做。
It could threaten to pull its own banks from SWIFT, or to seize infrastructure vital to the network, such as a data centre in Virginia.
它可能会威胁称从SWIFT撤出自己的银行，或控制对网络至关重要的基础设施，如位于弗吉尼亚州的数据中心。
In 2020 it used similar threats to force SITA, a network of global airlines based in Switzerland, to disconnect carriers from countries facing American sanctions.
2020年，它使用类似的威胁手段，迫使SITA（位于瑞士的全球航空公司网络）与美国制裁的国家切断在航空公司方面的联系。
[Paragraph 3]
But would excluding Russia from SWIFT actually be worthwhile?
但将俄罗斯排除在SWIFT之外真的值得吗？
There are three reasons to think that it might not.
有三个原因认为或许不值得。
It would harm but not cripple Russia; it would impose costs on the West; and it would be counterproductive in the long run.
这将损害但不会严重削弱俄罗斯；将会把成本强加在西方身上；从长远来看，将适得其反。
[Paragraph 4]
Start with the impact on Russia. The no-SWIFT scenario is not new to Moscow.
先说说对俄罗斯的影响。不使用SWIFT对于俄罗斯来说并不新鲜。
It has been bracing itself since 2014, when America first raised the idea of unplugging it from the network to punish it for invading Crimea (cooler heads eventually prevailed).
自2014年美国首次提出将其从网络中去除，以惩罚其入侵克里米亚的打算以来（冷静的头脑最终占了上风），俄罗斯就一直在自我扶植。
If Russia were excluded today, capital flight and a run on firms and banks reliant on foreign funding would ensue.
如果今天将俄罗斯排除在外，那么资本外逃，依赖外国资金的公司和银行挤兑问题将会接踵而至。
But coping mechanisms would then kick in. Russian banks and their foreign partners would use other means of communication, such as telex, phone and email.
但随后应对机制就会发挥作用。俄罗斯银行及其外国合作伙伴将使用其他通信手段，如电传、电话和电子邮件。
Transactions would migrate en masse to SPFS, a Russian alternative to SWIFT that is not nearly as ubiquitous and sophisticated, but still usable.
交易将大量转移到SPFS上，这是一种俄罗斯的SWIFT替代品，虽然不那么普遍和先进，但仍然可用。
As the payments infrastructure struggled at first to cope, Russia would suffer some disruption—but not disaster.
由于支付基础设施起初难以应付，所以俄罗斯将遭受一些中断，但不会是毁灭性的破坏。
Over time, investment in SPFS would make the system speedier.
随着时间的推移，对SPFS的投资将使系统速度更快。
[Paragraph 5]
Meanwhile, the West would suffer blowback.
与此同时，西方也将遭受打击。
Until now America has aimed its financial firepower at small or isolated countries such as Cuba, Iran and Myanmar.
到目前为止，美国已将其金融炮火对准了古巴、伊朗和缅甸等小国或孤立的国家。
Russia is twice the combined size of any economy America has ever embargoed.
俄罗斯的经济规模是美国所限制贸易的任何经济体总和的两倍。
Any disruption in Russia would spill over to the countries that have business dealings with it.
俄罗斯遭受的任何中断干扰都会波及到与之有商业往来的国家。
It is the EU’s fifth-largest trading partner, for instance.
比如，俄罗斯就是欧盟的第五大贸易伙伴。
And European banks have $56bn-worth of claims on Russian residents.
任何欧洲的银行都对俄罗斯居民拥有价值560亿美元的债权。
There would also be indirect damage through retaliation.
报复还会造成间接损害。
Iran in 2022 had a weak hand. But Russia is the source of 35% of Europe’s gas supply and is home to €310bn ($350bn) of EU assets.
伊朗在2022年的表现不佳。但俄罗斯是欧洲35%天然气供应的来源，也是欧盟3100亿欧元(约3500亿美元)资产的所在地。
[Paragraph 6]
In the long run America, too, would bear costs.
从长远看，美国也将付上代价。
It holds sway over international finance thanks to the dollar’s dominance and its pre-eminent role in global settlement systems.
由于美元的主导地位及其在全球结算系统中的卓越作用，它在国际金融中拥有支配地位。
Any country with uneasy relations with America would seek alternatives to SWIFT, while Europe might redouble its efforts to develop a more indepent payments network.
任何与美国关系不稳定的国家都将寻求SWIFT的替代方案，而欧洲可能会加倍努力发展一个更独立的支付网络。
Weaponising SWIFT against Russia would be seen by China as a “dress rehearsal”, says Adam Smith, a former American sanctions official now at Gibson Dunn, a law firm.
美方前制裁官员、现就职于吉布森律师事务所的亚当•史密斯表示，中国将把使用SWIFT武器对付俄罗斯的行为视为一次“彩排”。
It would provide China with the impetus to bolster CIPS, its rival to SWIFT, just as America’s other foes look for alternatives.
这将为中国提供CIPS，即SWIFT的竞争对手的动力，与美国的其他对手在寻找替代方案一样。
The network, which already counts some big foreign banks as members, allows messages to be transmitted in both Chinese and English.
该网络已经将一些大型外资银行纳为会员，并允许信息以中英两种语言传输。
Its daily average volume of transactions of 310bn yuan ($50bn) remains well behind SWIFT’s estimated $400bn, but it has nearly doubled in the past year.
它的日均交易量为3100亿元人民币(约500亿美元)，仍远低于约 4000亿美元的SWIFT，但它在过去一年几乎翻了一番。
Should it reach scale, America’s financial dominance would be threatened.
一旦规模扩大，美国的金融主导地位将受到威胁。
[Paragraph 7]
Other weapons of economic disruption exist.
还有其他破坏经济的武器。
America could, for example, blacklist big Russian financial institutions, preventing its own banks from dealing with them.
例如，美国可以将俄罗斯大型金融机构列入黑名单，阻止本国银行与这些机构打交道。
That would probably be as disruptive for Russia as a disconnection from SWIFT, without undermining the global financial architecture as much.
对俄罗斯来说，这可能跟切断与SWIFT的联系一样具有破坏性，但不会对全球金融体系造成那么大的破坏。
Yet the risk of immediate blowback would remain.
然而，即刻反弹的风险仍然存在。
That highlights a long-standing dilemma of wielding economic sanctions: although they are cheap when aimed at puny states, bigger targets can hit back, says Tom Keatinge of the Royal United Services Institute, a think-tank.
皇家联合军种研究所这一智库的汤姆·基廷说，这凸显出了一个实施经济制裁的长期困境：尽管针对弱小国家的攻击轻而易举，但大一些的国家可以绝地反击。
The West still has powder left. But it must choose its battles wisely.
西方仍有武器。但必须明智地挑选战场。
（恭喜读完，本篇英语词汇量 761左右）
原文出自：2021年12月18日《The Economist》Finance & economics版块。
精读笔记来源于：自由英语之路
本文整理：Fei Min
本文编辑校对：Irene
仅供个人英语学习交流使用。
【补充资料】（来源于百科）
【重点句子】（3个）
Flicking a switch seems safer than putting boots on the ground.
启动这一开关似乎比发动地面战争看起来安全些。
It would harm but not cripple Russia; it would impose costs on the West; and it would be counterproductive in the long run.
这将损害但不会严重削弱俄罗斯；将会把给成本强加在西方身上；从长远来看，将适得其反。
The West still has powder left. But it must choose its battles wisely.
西方仍有武器。但必须明智地挑选战场。
自由英语之路
